The Perfect Storm: Sandy, New Jersey Land Use, and the National Flood Insurance Program by Oorbeek, Matthew S.
Seton Hall University
eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship Seton Hall Law
5-1-2013
The Perfect Storm: Sandy, New Jersey Land Use,
and the National Flood Insurance Program
Matthew S. Oorbeek
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Recommended Citation
Oorbeek, Matthew S., "The Perfect Storm: Sandy, New Jersey Land Use, and the National Flood Insurance Program" (2013). Law
School Student Scholarship. 280.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/280
Matthew Oorbeek 1 
 
1 
 
 
The Perfect Storm: Sandy, New Jersey Land Use, and the National Flood Insurance Program 
 
 “Natural disasters, of course, are not “natural.” They are catastrophic events that result 
from the interaction of natural hazards and human presence.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Residents of New Jersey understand that the shore is a large part of the state’s identity. 
The New Jersey shore was the first heavily developed beach in the country, paving the way for 
the future shore culture that would develop.
2
 Many New Jerseyans have fond memories of 
spending their summers in the surf and sand, vacationing in any of the hundreds of coastal 
communities. Development of the coastal land in a highly densely populated state has exploded 
since the 1800s.
3
  
The population of New Jersey is also painfully aware of the destructive forces that lurk 
just off the coast. Hurricane Sandy swept homes off of their foundations, the ocean crossed entire 
barrier islands, and boardwalks fell into the sea.
4
 Seawalls have been constructed and beaches 
constantly replenished in order to protect coastal structures from storm surges
5
, but these 
protective actions can only do so much. While Sandy made landfall at what could arguably have 
been the worst moment in the tidal schedule, during both high and spring tide
6
, it was actions 
taken by both New Jersey and the federal government that caused the most destruction. 
                                                            
1 Rutherford H. Platt, Learning from Disasters: The Synergy of Law and Geography 38 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & 
ANALYSIS, 10150, 10152 (2008).  
2 See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. 
3 ORRIN H. PILKEY & KATHARINE L. DIXON, THE CORPS AND THE SHORE 1 (1996). 
4 Chris Kirkham & John Rudolf, Jersey Shore Development Failures Exposed by Hurricane Sandy, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/11/jersey-shore-development_n_2267557.html. 
5 See infra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.  
6 See infra note 90. 
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With the explosion in land development and the subsequent destruction of the beaches, 
New Jersey took action with a land management plan called the Coastal Area Facility Review 
Act (CAFRA).
7
 First enacted to regulate industrial development, over time CAFRA was 
increasingly used to protect the shore from residential expansion.
8
 The problem, however, were 
the loopholes contained within the Act that were exploited by municipalities seeking to increase 
tax revenue through increased construction.
9
 Local politics combined with a past lack of 
appreciation for the dangers of coastal living present obstacles to changing the problems 
associated with the poor land use decisions propagated by CAFRA.  
Further exacerbating the problem of over-development in dangerous coastal flood areas is 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) operated flood insurance program, known 
as the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).
10
 This insurance program foresaw that flood 
insurance premium rates would be subsidized in order to make premiums more affordable so that 
a greater percentage of the population would participate in the program.
11
 This in turn led to a 
decrease in the price of beach property due to taxpayers picking up some of the risk associated 
with coastal living.
12
 The structure of the NFIP prevents these issues from being addressed and 
only a major overhaul of the program can cure these ills.  
                                                            
7 Construction of Facility in Coastal Area; Permit; Exceptions, N.J. STAT. ANN. §13:19-5 (1993).  
8 See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.  
9 See infra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.  
10 National Flood Insurance Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§4011-4032 (2012). 
11 National Flood Insurance Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §4014(a)(1) (2012). 
12 See infra notes 122-124and accompanying text.  
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II. NEW JERSEY’S CURRENT LAND USE STRUCTURE COMBINED WITH THE 
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM HAS CONTRIBUTED TO RISKY 
COASTAL LAND DEVELOPMENT. 
 
On October 29, 2012, Hurricane Sandy brought heavy rains, strong winds, and powerful 
storm surges to the New Jersey shore.
13
 New Jersey land use laws as well as the National Flood 
Insurance Program produced risky coastal development which placed property and lives in the 
way of coastal storms. After these structures were built, coastal residents and businesses tried to 
protect their investments by building hard edifices and replenishing the eroding beaches. The 
result of these actions often led to both their money and sand on their beaches washing away. 
This was due solely to nature and how beach stabilization affects the shore.  
A. THE BEACH IS A MOVING BODY OF UNCONSOLIDATED LAND WHICH 
SHIFTS DUE TO THE FORCES OF NATURE, REGARDLESS OF MAN 
MADE STRUCTURES. 
 
Before investigating the issues created by the policies that encourage risky development 
in coastal flood areas, one must have an understanding of exactly what a beach is and its role in 
relation to the continental mainland. Beaches are extraordinary bodies of land that are constantly 
moving, shifting and changing. They form at the meetings of sea and land and consist of 
unconsolidated material.
14
 Given that these strips of land are situated adjacent to one of the most 
powerful forces on the planet, the shore is subjected to fierce winds, pounding waves, and strong 
                                                            
13 Chrstina Ng, Superstorm Sandy Crashes Ashore in New Jersey, ABC NEWS (Oct. 29, 2012), 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/hurricane-sandy-makes-landfall-jersey/story?id=17592795#.UXmKrrUsmf4 
14 This material is separated into three distinct categories based on grain size of the material that comprise the beach. 
Beaches can either be made up of sand, gravel, or boulders. These materials can be further broken down. For 
example sand can either be made from volcanic material such as in Hawaii, coral as in Bermuda, or quartz such as in 
the beaches of Cape Cod. Beaches can further be distinguished by the size and force of their waves such as beaches 
that are high energy, moderate energy, or low energy. PILKEY &. DIXON, supra note 3, at 20,22.  
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tides.
15
 It is the meeting of these great forces combined with the makeup of a beach that makes 
its function so critical. One of the most important functions of a beach is that it acts as a buffer 
between a coastal state and the forces of the sea, bending and twisting to absorb the strength of 
waves and wind.
16
 The importance of this role is amplified by the presence of a coastal storm 
which threatens the interior of a state.
17
  The combination of wave energy, sand, beach shape, 
and sea level allow beaches to move and carry out the important function of a shock absorber.
18
 
Each beach is unique in size, shape, location, and composition. This distinctiveness means that 
each beach protects inland regions differently. 
The New Jersey shore owes its form to one of the most distinct types of beach: the barrier 
islands. As their name indicates, barrier islands protect continental lands from the sea and its 
accompanying forces.
19
 A barrier island is a thin ribbon of sand that runs parallel to the coast.
20
 
In order for these types of beaches to form, four conditions must be present.
21
 The first condition 
is that sea levels must be rising.
22
 Secondly, the beach must be a part of a coastal plain, defined 
                                                            
15 See id. at 20. 
16 “It retreats when things get tough during a storm and returns when the weather is calm. It shapes itself to best 
absorb the pounding storm waves and forms a different shape when the waves are small.” Id.  
17  The beach flattens during a storm by moving sand from the upper beach to the 
lower beach. Flattening allows the wave energy of the breaking storm waves to 
be dissipated over a broadened surface relative to the beach before the storm. 
After the storm passes, much of the sand will return over ensuing months and 
years.  
Id. at 22.  
18 When any of these four factors changes, the others adjust. For example, when wave energy increases due to a 
storm, there is a temporary increase in sea level. The wave energy shifts sand according to its composition and 
quantity. The moving sand changes the shape, size, and location of the beach. The rise in sea level allows the sea to 
reach further inland, changing dunes and bluffs. The interaction between these four factors is called a beaches 
“dynamic equilibrium”. Id. at 23.  
19 WALLACE KAUFMAN & ORRIN H. PILKEY, JR., THE BEACHES ARE MOVING 113 (1998). 
20 PRINCETON WORDNET, http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=barrier%20island (last visited Mar. 20, 
2013). 
21 PILKEY & DIXON, supra note 3, at 15.  
22 Sea levels began to rise at the end of the last ice age, approximately 18,000 years ago. As the sea level began to 
rise, coastal plains were flooded and the sea extended miles into continents. The ocean began to fill in ridge flanked 
valleys. Over time, these ridges eroded and turned to sand. Storms most likely cut through this sand and separated 
what was once one ridge into separate independent islands. Id. at 15-16. 
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as a low flat surface that extends to the sea.
23
  The third condition that must be present for the 
formation of barrier islands is the existence of a large supply of sand.
24
 Without a large supply, 
sand could not accumulate into island formations.
25
 The final condition that must exist is the 
presence of waves which are large and powerful enough to shift large quantities of sand 
around.
26
 If these four conditions were not present, the barrier islands that make up the New 
Jersey shore would not exist.
27
  
While every type of beach is dynamic in nature, bending and moving to the forces of 
wind and sea, barrier islands are beaches that are mobile to an extreme. Due to rising sea levels, 
barrier islands are subject to a process called “island migration”.28 Island migration occurs when 
sand on the ocean side of the island washes over it and moves towards the mainland.
29
 In a sense, 
the island rolls over itself and moves closer to the continental land mass.
30
 Island migration is a 
natural process that aids in protecting continental lands; the barrier island moves landward as the 
mainland retreats in the face of rising ocean levels, allowing the island to absorb energy 
produced by the sea that would normally reach the interior.
31
 Natural processes, such as island 
migration, are not inherently damaging. It’s only when humans interact with these processes that 
                                                            
23 Id. at 15. 
24 Id.  
25 Id. 
26 Id.   
27 For example, Florida has large quantities of sand, is located on a coastal plain, and is subject to rising sea levels. 
However, the coast of Florida is missing the requisite large waves for the creation of barrier islands. The result is 
that the large supply of sand off the coast does not move inland and form islands. Id. at 15-16. 
28 Id. at 16.  
29 KAUFMAN & PILKEY JR., supra note 19, at 96. 
30  The ocean side of the island retreats as storms push sand across the island to 
form overwash fans. Overwash fans, which often extend into the lagoon behind 
the island, may cause the island to widen in a landward direction. Simultaneous 
shoreline retreat of the open-ocean side of the island results in island migration.”  
PILKEY & DIXON, supra note 3, at 16. 
31 While island migration is a naturally occurring process, human forces may interrupt and negatively affect this 
procedure. As sea levels continue to rise, as they have within the past century, both sides of barrier islands appear to 
be disappearing due to the process of erosion. It is believed that this dual side erosion is being caused by rising sea 
levels which is thought by some to be a result of human actions. Id. at 20.   
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disasters result. When a coastal storm hits New Jersey and the beach attempts to retreat and roll 
over itself, it is met with homes, businesses, seawalls, and highways.
32
 
While the sea threatens to take New Jersey’s beaches and barrier islands roll over 
themselves through the process of island migration, buildings continue to rise from the sand and 
people are forced to protect their investments and lives from natural processes. While this paper 
focuses primarily on land use management and the subsidies created by flood insurance, there 
are coastal protection systems available to shore communities and they are often implemented in 
in an attempt to keep the sea at bay, sand on the beaches, and buildings standing. This paper 
briefly discusses these coastal protection devices in order to gain a clearer vision of the beach 
and its coastal communities.  
 The most visible of the coastal protection devices are hard stabilization structures which 
include man-made structures such as seawalls and groins.
33
 Hard stabilization involves erecting 
structures to shield the shoreline and hold it in place.
34
 The most widely used form of hard 
stabilization is the seawall, a structure built to run parallel to the coast.
35
 While seawalls are 
highly effective tools to combat the destruction of coastal structures, they often destroy the very 
thing that draws people to the shore, the beach.
36
 Whereas a beach absorbs the energy created by 
waves by way of moving, seawalls are stationary objects that do not yield until broken or 
breached. This causes the sand in front of the wall to move further out to sea and accelerates 
                                                            
32 See id. at 34. 
33 PILKEY & DIXON, supra note 3, at 38.  
34 Id. 
35 The size and make up of seawalls varies almost as much as the types of beaches. They can be constructed of 
wood, concrete, rock, tires, or various other types of materials. They are tall and short, large and small. See id.  
36 Besides destroying the beach, seawalls also impose other negatives on coastal living. Due to their very nature, 
seawalls are permanent structures. They cannot be torn down without great expense. Therefore, seawalls cannot 
change with the engineering landscape when it comes to coastal protection. On the aesthetic front, seawalls are not 
very pleasant to view. They ruin the uninterrupted view of nature and are often made from unattractive material.  
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erosion of the beaches on both ends of the wall.
37
 Groins are another example of a hard stabilizer 
used to protect structures by preventing erosion from taking sections of beach. Unlike seawalls 
which are built parallel to the shore line, groins are built perpendicular, jutting out into the 
ocean.
38
 The purpose of a groin is to trap sand in a certain area and stop erosion of a particular 
portion of the beach.
39
 This occurs because of the long shore flow of sand which allows the 
beach to function as if it were a river of sand.
40
 While a groin does its job as prescribed, it does 
so at the detriment to neighboring areas of beach.
41
 Although seawall and groin type structures 
do provide a function, the consequence of their use is further destruction of the beach, the one 
thing standing between the mainland and the power of the ocean.  
 Soft stabilization of the beach consists of beach replenishment which involves nourishing 
the beach with sand exported from other areas.
42
 The purpose of this process is to replace the 
sand that had been removed from the beach due to erosion.
43
 Often, this erosion is a consequence 
of rising sea levels or the construction of manmade objects.
44
 This method of coastal protection 
has been successful and many beaches continue to exist through replenishment, but the cost is 
                                                            
37   Wave energy is intensified rather than dissipated, so even more sand is swept 
offshore to the continental shelf. This direct participation of a seawall in the 
degradation of a beach is called active loss. As the beach narrows in front of the 
wall, reducing the available beach area, the amount of sand transported past the 
wall in both directions is reduced because the smaller surface area of the surf 
zone. The reduction leads to erosion on adjacent shoreline reaches.  
PILKEY & DIXON, supra note 3, at 40. 
38 KARL F. NORDSTROM ET AL., LIVING WITH THE NEW JERSEY SHORE 35 (1986). 
39 Id.  
40 The various forces at work where the land meets the sea, particularly wind and waves, keep the sand in motion. 
Longshore currents then take this suspended sand and move it in the direction that the water travelling. These 
currents are often formed when waves strike the beach at an angle less than 90 degrees.  As the sand moves along 
this “river”, it gets deposited to the beaches down the current. See generally PILKEY & DIXON, supra note 3, at 29-
30. 
41
 NEW JERSEY DEP’T OF ENVTL., I NEW JERSEY SHORE PROTECTION MASTER PLAN PROT., 224.N5N47, ch. 2 at 2 
(1981).  
42 This sand often comes from offshore sand deposits, inlet tidal deltas, or another beach located further upland. 
PILKEY & DIXON, supra note 3, at 49. 
43 Id.  
44 See e.g. id. at 13, 43. 
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extraordinarily high.
45
 These projects must continue indefinitely as sea levels continue to rise.
46
 
Furthermore, there can be no definite schedule to when a beach needs to be replenished due to 
sand loss.
47
 Replacing sand that has been lost on a beach is a time consuming and expensive 
enterprise requiring time for planning.
48
 However, science will never advance to a point where 
large storms, that strip beaches of sand, can be predicted and incorporated into this planning 
schedule.
49
 So while humans have engineered ways to prevent our beaches from eroding, money 
will need to be spent for an indefinite amount of time to keep these programs operating. 
B. NEW JERSEY LAND USE REGULATION AND THE COAST 
 
Both hard and soft stabilization act as band aids on a wound rather than trying to prevent 
the cut from occurring in the first place. Worse still, while protecting structures that have been 
constructed on the beach over decades, hard stabilization tends to destroy the very beach which 
attracted people to New Jersey over two hundred years ago. The only one-hundred percent 
effective way to protect the structures located in coastal flood plains is to manage the land and 
prevent or limit certain types of construction.   
1. PRE CAFRA: “‘I KNOW EVERY INCH OF THIS PLACE, EVERY 
ROCK, TREE, WEED, AND FOLD OF THE EARTH.’ NO ONE CAN 
SAY THAT ABOUT THE SHORELINE OR THE BEACHES.”50 
 
Before there were the glitzy art deco buildings of Miami, long before the Gulf Coast was 
transformed into a tourist’s paradise, there was the New Jersey shore. The wealthy from New 
                                                            
45 NEW JERSEY DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., supra note 41, at 4.  
46 As sea levels continue to rise, the ocean will swallow up larger sections of the beach. As this occurs, coastal 
communities will be forced to constantly replace the lost sand. Id.  
47 Id.  
48 See generally PILKEY & DIXON, supra note 3, at 76. 
49 PILKEY & DIXON, supra note 3, at 91-92. 
50 KAUFMAN & PILKEY JR., supra note 19, at 12. 
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York and Pennsylvania flocked to the shore to cool off in the summer months.
51
 It was due to 
this influx of wealth that the New Jersey shore was the first comprehensively developed beach in 
America.
52
  On July 1, 1801, the first advertisement appeared for the New Jersey shore in the 
Philadelphia Aurora.
53
  The advertisement proclaimed the beauty of the shore while also 
foreshadowing the numerous modern beach resorts that would come to exist.
54
 However, the 
realization of heavy development was met with negative consequences.  
 The success of the New Jersey shore would lead to the beach’s downfall. Just as the shore 
was becoming a popular vacation destination, owners of tourist establishments began to notice 
that their investments were vulnerable to great natural forces.
55
 Owners began to construct 
seawalls and groins in order to protect coastal buildings from storm surges created by coastal 
storms.
56
 As previously discussed, the thought behind constructing these hard stabilizers was to 
protect the buildings on the barrier islands from powerful waves and storm surges.
57
 The 
consequence of the construction of seawalls and groins was the destruction of the beaches.
58
 
New Jersey turned into a model on how not to develop a beach, leading to the formation of the 
term “New Jerseyization” of coastlines.59 Concerns stemming from the “New Jerseyization” of 
the shore paired with the exponential growth of communities all along the beach caused the U.S. 
                                                            
51 PILKEY & DIXON, supra note 3, at 1. 
52 Id.  
53 R. CRAIG KOEDEL, SOUTH JERSEY HERITAGE: A SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL HISTORY 105 (1979).  
54 See id.  
55 PILKEY &. DIXON, supra note 3, at 1. 
56 Id.  
57 See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.  
58  Efforts to armor coastlines with seawalls often had the opposite effect, 
increasing erosion as waves crashed into hard structures and carried more sand 
away. Jetties and groins trapped sand in some place along the coast, yet they 
also robbed nearby beaches of incoming sand, causing even greater deterioration 
of shorelines. 
Kirkham & Rudolf, supra note 4, at 3.  
59  “New Jerseyization eventually became the term used for the process of stemming erosion at the price of the 
beach.” PILKEY &. DIXON, supra note 3, at 1. 
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Army Corps of Engineers to classify 81 percent of New Jersey’s coastline as being in “critical” 
condition from beach erosion.
60
 As with other disaster mitigation programs, coastal land 
management is largely reactive and driven by disaster.
61
  In 1973, the government of the State of 
New Jersey recognized that explosive growth mixed with eroding beaches was a disaster that 
needed to be dealt with through land management. 
2. NEW JERSEY FAILED TO REGULATE COASTAL RESIDENTIAL 
DEVELOPMENT WITH THE COASTAL AREA FACILITY REVIEW 
ACT DUE TO THE GROWTH OF THE TWENTY FOUR UNIT 
DEVELOPMENTS. 
 
When explosive growth occurs in a previously undeveloped area, government often does 
not see the immediate need to regulate land use due to unrecognized dangers. However, 
hindsight is 20/20 and emergencies and disasters often bring these threats to the public eye. This 
is often the time when government steps in and attempts to fix the problems retroactively that 
human development created. This occurred in the days following the Great Fire of London in 
1666 to as recently as Hurricane Sandy.
62
 Fast forward to New Jersey in 1973; after decades of 
exponential growth, New Jersey legislators realized the need for coastal land management if the 
New Jersey shore was going to survive for future generations. However, regulation could not 
unduly burden these tax revenue generating towns. Enter the Coastal Area Facility Review Act 
                                                            
60 Kirkham & Rudolf, supra note 4, at 3. 
61 PILKEY &. DIXON, supra note 3, at 2. 
62  London was a financial success but a geographic disaster waiting to happen: Private 
structures clogged the narrow lanes and passageways, encroached on market spaces, and 
blocked access to the Thames River. With no regulation of building size, location, and 
construction materials, the fire was inevitable. And without access to water, it could not 
be halted. …King Charles II issued an astounding proclamation a week after the disaster 
calling for restraint and foresight in the rebuilding process, pending a full investigation of 
the causes of the disaster. ...The king then appointed a Royal Commission…to study the 
causes of the disaster and to draft a Parliamentary law to codify rules for rebuilding. The 
resulting Act for Rebuilding London adopted on February 8, 1667, has been described as 
London’s first “Complete code of building regulations. 
 Platt, supra note 1, at 10150. 
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(CAFRA). Like all government regulations, CAFRA had to delicately balance the interests of 
protecting the coastal environment while also encouraging prosperous and responsible coastal 
development.
63
 Interestingly enough, CAFRA’s main objective was not to protect the beach from 
residential and commercial development, but in the decades that followed, amendments to the 
law would focus heavily on these issues.
64
 Nevertheless, having recognized that coastal 
construction was affecting the beach, the legislature sought to regulate certain types of residential 
development.
65
 
In its 1973 iteration, CAFRA regulated commercial and industrial development as well as 
new housing developments with 25 or more dwelling units.
66
 These regulations came in the form 
of requiring certain types of land development, as described in the statute, to apply and receive a 
permit from the State. CAFRA was fairly successful in regulating commercial and industrial 
development around the New Jersey shore, but the regulation of residential construction was not 
as successful. Municipalities were able to take advantage of CAFRA due to their power to zone 
                                                            
63   [T]o encourage the development of compatible land uses in order to improve 
the overall economic position of the inhabitants of that area within the 
framework of a comprehensive environmental design strategy which preserves 
the most ecologically sensitive and fragile area from inappropriate development 
and provides adequate environmental safeguards for the construction of any 
facilities in the coastal area.  
Conservation and Development-Parks and Reservations, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:19-2 (1993). 
64 “The impetus for the enactment of CAFRA in 1973 came from several proposals for industrial development along 
the New Jersey coastline to support proposed offshore oil and gas exploration. These proposed projects would have 
dramatically reduced the recreational benefits of the coastal area.” Michael J. Gross & Jeffrey S. Beenstock, 
Implications of the new CAFRA Legislation, NEW JERSEY LAWYER, THE MAGAZINE, April 1995, at 13, 13.  
65   [T]hat certain portions of the coastal area are now suffering serious adverse 
environmental effects resulting from existing facility activity impacts that would 
preclude or tend to preclude those multiple uses which support diversity and are 
in the best long-term, social, economic, aesthetic and recreational interests of all 
people of the State.  
Conservation and Development-Parks and Reservations, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:19-2 (1993). 
66 Gross & Beenstock, supra note 64, at 13. 
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under what is called “home rule”.67 Therefore, while new residential developments with 25 or 
more dwellings were required to gain state approval before building was to commence, the 
municipalities could zone areas for fewer than 25 residential dwellings and allow construction to 
take place without fear of state intervention. The combination of the high growth rates of the 
shore plus the opportunity for increased tax revenue led to the creation of the “24 unit 
development”.68 The result was that CAFRA had barely made a blip in the residential growth 
rate at the New Jersey shore. It was not for the lack of trying; it was made clear through the 
Department of Environmental Protection’s failed attempts at regulating construction by the shore 
that CAFRA would need to be amended.
69
  
3. NEW JERSEY GETS SERIOUS: CAFRA’S 1993 AMENDMENT 
 
Due to the sudden increase of 24 unit developments and the apparent failure in ability to 
regulate coastal residential construction, CAFRA was in dire need of an amendment to close its 
loopholes. Understandably, municipalities and other coastal interests were against making 
changes to CAFRA and allowing the state to further regulate land use. It took a combination of 
damaging natural events to shift the tide in favor of fixing CAFRA.
70
 The businesses and 
homeowners of the Jersey shore coalesced and forced a compromise; the 24 unit loophole would 
be closed in specified areas of CAFRA
71
 enforcement but the absolute right to rebuild following 
                                                            
67 Home rule is defined as “Power granted either by the Constitution or Legislature or both to municipal 
governments to organize themselves to carry out a range of governmental activities under their own authority and to 
preserve health, safety, and general welfare”. Power to Zone, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-62 (1983). 
68 Kirkham & Rudolf, supra note 4, at 3. 
69 See Gross & Beenstock, supra note 64, at 13-14. See generally Dept. of Envtl. Prot. v. Stavola, 103 N.J. 425 
(1986) 
70 The early 1990’s saw large algae blooms sustained by polluted waters off the New Jersey coast, prompting many 
beaches in the state to close. The combination of algae blooms and powerful nor’easters forced New Jersey to take 
action. See Kirkham & Rudolf, supra note 4, at 5. 
71 The new CAFRA legislation separated the regulated coastal area into four geographic locations: (1) beaches and 
dunes; (2) 150 feet landward from the mean high water line; (3) the landward area between 150 feet and 500 feet 
from the mean high water line; and (4) any area of CAFRA jurisdiction beyond 500 feet of the mean high water line. 
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storms came into being.
72
 This absolute right to rebuild was included in the 1993 CAFRA 
compromise even though the DEP knew the destruction that storms could cause to coastal 
communities as early as 1981.
73
 While shorefront regulation is primarily in the hands of 
municipalities given their power to zone, the 1993 CAFRA amendment shifted some of this 
responsibility to the state. However, with the right to rebuild, this responsibility would be 
arduous to exercise. Furthermore, insurance was needed to protect the large amount of homes 
that now had the unfettered right to rebuild following a natural disaster. 
C. THE NFIP: NATIONALIZING FLOOD INSURANCE 
 
Flood insurance as we currently know it did not exist until 1968 with the passage of the 
National Flood Insurance Act.
74
 After large floods of the Missouri River destroyed lands 
spreading from St. Joseph, Missouri and Sioux Falls, Iowa in 1956, President Eisenhower 
attempted to initiate a nationalized flood insurance program.
75
 However, Congress never funded 
the proposal for fear that subsidized insurance would draw people into these flood plains instead 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
A permit is required for all development on beaches and dunes. For the area between the mean high water line and 
150 feet landward, a CAFRA permit is required for a residential development with 3 or more dwellings, a 
commercial development with 5 or more parking spaces, and any public or industrial development.  Development in 
the geographic area between 150 feet and 500 feet from the mean high water line requires a CAFRA permit for a 
residential development with at least 25 dwellings, a commercial development with 50 or more parking spaces, and 
any public or industrial development. For the remaining areas under CAFRA jurisdiction beyond 500 feet of the 
mean high water line, a CAFRA permit is required for any residential development with at least 75 dwelling units, a 
commercial development with 150 or more parking spaces, and any public or industrial development. Construction 
of Facility in Coastal Area; Permit; Exceptions, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:19-5 (1993). 
72 Construction of Facility in Coastal Area; Permit; Exceptions, N.J. STAT. ANN. §13:19-5.2(b) (1993). 
73   Hurricanes and northeasters traveling along the New Jersey coast have damaged 
beaches and shore development throughout recorded history. Since 1900, the 
Atlantic and Gulf coast barrier islands have been affected by more than 100 
hurricanes. Although hurricanes account for most of the damages along the New 
Jersey coast, 35 to 40 winter storms (northeasters) each year have enough force 
to erode beaches.  
NEW JERSEY DEPT. OF ENVTL. PROT., 224.N5N47, NEW JERSEY SHORE PROTECTION MASTER PLAN Vol. I Ch. I at 39 
(1981).  
74 National Flood Insurance Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4001-4130 (1968). 
75 Christine A. Klein & Sandra B. Zellmer, Mississippi River Stories: Lessons from a Century of Unnatural 
Disasters, 60 SMU L. REV. 1471, 1488-89 (2007).  
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of keeping them away.
76
 With the apparent ability to look forward in time, that Congress foresaw 
what would occur with the current National Flood Insurance Program and land development in 
the coastal flood plains of the New Jersey shore.  
As far as government involvement goes, second to land use regulations, flood insurance 
is the strongest driver of coastal development. The skepticism following the previous statement 
is understandable.
77
 However, flood insurance does not operate as other types of insurance does. 
Unlike different categories of insurance, private insurance companies are not able to profitably 
issue flood insurance.
78
 Given flood insurance’s impracticability in the private sector, the federal 
government enacted The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 which provided federal-
subsidized flood insurance.
79
 This act created the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) 
which falls under the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) authority.80 In order to 
combat the high prices which resulted in private flood insurance being unworkable, the NFIP 
would charge policy holders a lower than market rate premium.
81
 Given this subsidized rate, 
premiums paid by policy holders do not reflect the actual risk of flooding even though the rates 
are closer to the actuarial rate than they have been in the past.
82
 With an amendment to the Act 
                                                            
76 Id.  at 1489-90. 
77 One rarely thinks of insurance as being a driver towards purchasing something on the open market. For example, 
when shopping for a new vehicle, insurance does not drive a buyer to purchase a specific vehicle. The price of 
insurance premiums may discourage the purchase of a particular type of car, such as a sports car. However, as it will 
be made clear, the way private insurance functions would not motivate a buyer to purchase a specific good.   
78 Insurance works by spreading risk among a number of policy holders. However, the two attempts at private flood 
insurance led to strong adverse selection problems. That is, only those whose property was at high risk of flooding 
were willing to purchase flood insurance; because of this the risk associated with flooding could not be spread 
amongst policy holders and remain relatively affordable. Flood insurance premiums would be prohibitively high and 
insurance companies were not able to make a profit. Marc R. Poirier, Takings and Natural Hazards Policy: Public 
Choice on the Beachfront, 46 RUTGERS L.REV. 243, 298 (1993).  
79 National Flood Insurance Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §4014(a)(1) (2012). 
80 The National Flood Insurance Program, http://www.fema.gov/national-flood-insurance-program (last visited Apr. 
26, 2013).   
81 The premiums policy holders were to pay was a balance between “…the actuarially necessary amount and the 
(presumably lower) amount people are willing to pay for it.” Poirier, supra note 78, at 300.  
82 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-1063T, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM (2010). 
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being passed in 1973, all housing that was federally financed, regulated, insured or supervised 
was required to purchase flood insurance.
83
 
 Besides being federally subsidized, there are several other components to the NFIP which 
prohibit it from managing risks. The NFIP cannot reject high-risk applicants from purchasing 
flood insurance.
84
 The result of such a policy led to the NFIP insuring applicants who would 
otherwise be denied coverage if flood insurance was managed by private insurers. Furthermore, 
the NFIP cannot drop policy holders who file multiple and frequent claims.
85
 This results in 
repetitive loss properties, further putting a strain on the program. Finally, the NFIP cannot 
increase premium rates to recoup losses or to reflect the true risks associated with flooding given 
that the program is subject to statutory limits on rate increases.
86
 These aspects of the NFIP, 
combined with federally-subsidized premium rates, were put into effect to protect those who own 
property in flood prone areas, such as the Jersey shore. In its current form, the NFIP further 
exacerbates the problems caused by strong coastal storms such as hurricanes.  
III. COASTAL DEVELOPMENT MEETS MOTHER NATURE IN BRIGANTINE AND 
BEYOND. 
 
It is often said that storms are only disasters due to human action.
87
 While man did not 
create Hurricane Sandy on October 22, 2012
88
, it was the construction of buildings, roads, and 
other structures that led to the tremendous damage that ensued.  This super-storm aimed its 
                                                            
83 Poirier, supra note 78, at 300. 
84 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 82.  
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 “Natural disasters, of course, are not ‘natural’. They are catastrophic events that result from the interaction of 
natural hazards and human presence.” Platt, supra note 1, at 10152.  
88 Chrstina Ng, Superstorm Sandy Crashes Ashore in New Jersey, ABC NEWS (Oct. 29, 2012), 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/hurricane-sandy-makes-landfall-jersey/story?id=17592795#.UXmKrrUsmf4 
Matthew Oorbeek 16 
 
16 
 
deadly winds and storm surge right for the beaches of New Jersey, making landfall on October 
29th near Brigantine
89
 during one of the most dangerous times in the regions tidal schedule, 
during both high tide and spring tide.
90
  This storm surge brought large quantities of ocean water 
towards the main land.
91
 While the beach works as a natural buffer against a storm surge, when 
objects are built upon this buffer, damage is sustained.
92
 It has been estimated that Sandy 
inflicted $36.9 billion in damages directly on the state of New Jersey, with most of that damage 
being concentrated in the coastal regions.
93
 Housing damaged by the storm in New Jersey will 
cost $4.9 billion to repair, while damaged businesses will cost an additional $8.3 billion.
94
 These 
costs do not take into account the damage caused indirectly by Sandy which weakened coastal 
defenses against other storms.
95
  
In the months following Hurricane Sandy, the battle cry “Rebuild!” could be heard 
throughout New Jersey, especially in areas whose economic base was ravaged by the storm.
96
  
Besides pressure from homeowners and businesses, politicians were feeling the pressure from 
                                                            
89 Sandy made landfall labeled as a post tropical cyclone with hurricane-force winds. Id.  
90 There exists a daily cycle of tides at a beach where there are often two high tides and two low tides. These tides 
are created by the moons gravitational force and its impact on the ocean. There is also a monthly tide cycle. When 
the moon is either full or new, its gravitational pull on the ocean is at its strongest. Hurricane Sandy made landfall 
during a full moon and the resulting spring tide. Due to this combination of high tide and spring tide, the ocean 
water was about twenty percent higher than average due to the moons gravity. Paul Adams, The Dictionary of 
Hurricane Sandy: Spring Tide, POPULAR SCIENCE (Oct. 29, 2012, 1:30pm).  
91 Id.  
92 When a storm surge threatens to come into contact with the mainland, the beach will act as a “shock absorber”. 
The beach will actually retreat and move inward as a storm moves in and it reappears when the sea is becomes calm. 
As the beach retreats it also flattens. This flattening causes the wave energy to dissipate over a greater surface area, 
thus protecting the inland areas. PILKEY &. DIXON, supra note 3, at 20,22,27.  
93 Of that total, $29.4 billion will be used for repairs while the remaining $7.4 billion will be used to mitigate and 
prevent future damage. OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, CHRISTIE ADMINISTRATION RELEASES TOTAL HURRICANE 
SANDY DAMAGE ASSESSMENT OF $36.9 BILLION (Nov. 28, 2012) 
http://www.state.nj.us/governor/news/news/552012/approved/20121128e.html. 
94 “[O]ver 30,000 businesses and homes were destroyed or experienced structural damage, while 42,000 homes were 
impacted in some other way.” Id. 
95 Several winter storms impacted the coastal regions of New Jersey the winter following Hurricane Sandy. The 
damage caused was increased due to the lack of protective dunes along the beaches. These dunes were wiped out by 
the storm surge created by Hurricane Sandy. See Winter Storm Could Cause “Pockets of Major Flooding” along the 
Jersey Shore, NJ.COM, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2013/03/storm_to_skirt_new_jersey_thou.html (Mar. 5, 
2013). 
96 Kirkham & Rudolf, supra note 4, at 7. 
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the thought of decreased tax revenue. Soon after landfall, Governor Chris Christie used 
emotional references to spur the rebuilding effort, stating that the Jersey shore is “…a part of the 
cultural heartbeat of our state”.97 While recognizing that decisions regarding rebuilding needed 
to be well thought out, certain stop-gap construction commenced soon after the storm passed in 
order to mitigate damages and allow emergency and aid vehicles into affected areas.
98
 
 The first thoughtful steps regarding rebuilding New Jersey’s coastal areas have been 
taken by FEMA. Before Hurricane Sandy, the flood maps in place across the coastal region of 
New Jersey dated from the 1980s.
99
  In order to augment these outdated Flood Insurance Rate 
Maps (FIRMS), FEMA released Advisory Base Flood Elevation (ABEFs)
100
 maps to aid in the 
reconstruction effort.
101
  These new ABEF maps cover 194 coastal municipalities in New 
Jersey.
102
  Zoning and building codes have been exposed by the ABEF as being grossly outdated 
by not reflecting the increased risk of flooding in coastal areas since the 1980s.
103
 While these 
maps are advisory, with the official flood maps being unveiled at a later date, the state of New 
Jersey has already adopted the ABEF maps, incorporating them into rebuilding efforts.
104
 By 
accepting these new advisory flood maps, homes that have been substantially damaged by 
                                                            
97 Id.  
98 Route 35, a major thoroughfare in many shore towns, needed to be repaired quickly so emergency vehicles to 
affected areas. Therefore, long term viability of this structure was not a first priority. FEMA has provided funds to 
close an inlet breach in Mantaloking soon after the storm. Many are worried that permanent structures may be 
developed before serious decisions are made about rebuilding the coastal area. See Kirkham & Rudolf, supra note 4, 
at 1.  
99 See FEMA, HURRICANE SANDY ADVISORY BASE FLOOD ELEVATIONS (ABFES) (Nov. 2012), 
http://184.72.33.183/Public/Public_Documents/Sandy_ABFE_Fact_Sheet.pdf. 
100 See ADVISORY BASE FLOOD ELEVATIONS MAP, 
http://fema.maps.arcgis.com/home/webmap/viewer.html?webmap=2f0a884bfb434d76af8c15c26541a545 
(last visited Apr. 25, 2013).  
101 Q & A: What FEMA’s Advisory Flood Maps Mean to New Jersey, NJ.COM, 
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2013/01/what_femas_advisory_flood_maps.html (Jan. 13, 2013, 2:48pm).  
102 Id.  
103 Id.  
104 Christie: NJ Adopting Feds’ Advisory Flood Maps, YAHOO.COM, http://finance.yahoo.com/video/christie-nj-
adopting-feds-advisory-212053216.html (Jan. 24, 2013).  
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Hurricane Sandy must be elevated in accordance with the flood maps.
105
 To encourage residents 
in coastal regions to raise their damaged structures to meet compliance levels, both a carrot and a 
stick have been offered. FEMA has offered up to $30,000 to help offset the costs of raising a 
building to meet its current ABFE map levels.
106
 Those who do not comply with the new 
advisory maps may see an increase in their flood insurance premium.
107
 
 Raising a home to be in compliance with flood maps does not solve the problem of over 
development in dangerous flood prone areas.  However, such a program exists within the state of 
New Jersey to solve this problem and Governor Chris Christie has offered it as a way for 
homeowners to eliminate almost all possibility of coastal storm damage. Run by the New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection, the Blue Acres Program was established in 1995 to 
distribute “grants and loans to municipalities and counties who acquire lands in coastal areas that 
have been damaged by storms, that may be prone to storm damage, or that buffer or protect other 
lands from storm damage”.108 When the Act was passed in 1995, the program was funded with 
$9 million for post-storm purchases.
109
  By purchasing property in the area in which  the Coastal 
Blue Acre Program operates
110
, the state can help reduce damage caused by storms by both 
                                                            
105 A local floodplain administrator will define a home as being substantially damaged by Hurricane Sandy if it has 
sustained damage equal to or exceeding “50 percent of the market value of the structure before the damage 
occurred”. Flood Elevation FAQs: New Jersey’s Emergency Flood Elevation Rule, NJ.GOV, 
http://www.nj.gov/dep/special/hurricane-sandy/docs/abfes-faq-20130212.pdf (last visited April 25, 2013).  
106 The money a homeowner may receive from FEMA is tied to the cost the homeowner would incur in raising their 
home. Id. 
107 Due to these most recent maps being advisory flood maps, there will be no immediate effect on anyone’s flood 
insurance premium. However, once these maps are finalized, rates may be increased for not meeting the final maps 
elevation standards. These final flood maps will likely be close to the current advisory flood maps.  The NFIP 
determines rates based on a home’s elevation above the flood-plane. Therefore, the closer a home is to the flood 
level, the higher insurance premiums will be. Id.  
108 Green Acres Program, NJ.GOV, http://www.nj.gov/dep/greenacres/blue.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2013).  
109 Post storm purchases must have been reduced in value by at least 50% as a consequence of storm damage. Id.  
110  One hundred twenty two municipalities and eight counties are eligible to apply 
for CBA funds. Coastal area lands eligible for purchase with CBA funds can be 
lands anywhere on a coastal barrier island, lands within 150 feet landward of the 
mean high water line of any tidal water, or lands within 150 feet of the landward 
limit of a beach or dune. 
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removing people from hazardous areas as well as increasing the beaches natural buffering 
abilities.
111
 This program, however, can only be one tool in the states tool box in dealing with 
reckless coastal development.
112
 The Blue Acre Program relies on state funding to carry out its 
mission. In a cash-strapped state that is still recovering from an economic recession, it is unlikely 
that New Jersey can afford to purchase the large amount of coastal land needed to be effective in 
thwarting coastal storm damage.  
IV. OBSTACLES TO REAL CHANGE 
A. THE LACK OF WILL IN NEW JERSEY POLITICS REPRESENTS A REAL 
THREAT TO PROTECTING THE COAST OF NEW JERSEY. 
 
While real steps have previously been taken to protect the New Jersey shore, Hurricane 
Sandy offers an opportunity to move forward by leaps and bounds to truly protect the people of 
coastal New Jersey and to restore the beaches and their ability to protect the coast by 
implementing responsible land management plans. However, along with having the first heavily 
developed beach area comes the glue in the political gears which makes meaningful change slow 
and difficult. Nowhere is this as true in terms of coastal damage protection as with land use 
regulation. Political will to effectuate change is always shifting and fluid, due to the substantial 
tax revenue brought in by coastal tourism and placed into state and local municipal coffers.
113
 
Furthermore, there is an entrenched “shore culture” in New Jersey which would push back 
against any perceived threat to the beach lifestyle.
114
  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Id.  
111 See generally PILKEY &. DIXON, supra note 3, at 34. 
112 Id.  
113 See generally Poirier, supra note 78, at 263. 
114 See generally id. at 260-61. 
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The biggest obstacle to changing coastal land management and having it reflect coastal 
flood conditions is local politics. Where a social group of people share a common aim or goal, 
such as people involved in coastal areas, interest groups form to protect their member’s 
objectives.
115
 Due to the desirability of living by the beach and the resulting high property 
values, the interests at the New Jersey shore tend to be financially well off.
116
 As a financially 
strong interest group, coastal residents can exert considerable influence on the legislature and 
local politicians to protect their interests.
117
 This is especially true when they believe that their 
common interests are threatened, especially when the status quo begins to shift. 
When a tragedy on the scale of Hurricane Sandy hits, communities rally together. As 
stated previously, this is the precise time that the shore interests mobilize to secure their interests 
when their way of life seems threatened.
118
 These strong interests will often make it an almost 
impossible task for state and local government to effect change.
119
 If one was to accept this 
“strong interest group” logic then government would rarely act with proper diligence in changing 
coastal law following a coastal disaster. This problem is further exacerbated in New Jersey given 
the levels of government that control coastal land use. CAFRA requires that permits be obtained 
from the State for construction in certain defined coastal regions.
120
 However, the remaining 
lands are all zoned by municipalities, including coastal lands not covered by CAFRA.
121
 As local 
government officials are elected by the constituents in their respective areas, the strong coastal 
                                                            
115 See id. at 256. 
116 The convenience to beach access, ocean views, and the coastal micro climate has made shore property very 
desirable. This desirability combined with the naturally limited supply of coastal land leads this property to be 
relatively expensive. The result is those who own such property are “…disproportionately rich and powerful”. Id. at 
360. 
117 See id.  
118 Id. at 269.  
119 Id.  
120 Construction of Facility in Coastal Area; Permit; Exceptions, N.J. STAT. ANN. §13:19-5 (1993). 
121 See Power to Zone, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-62 (1983). 
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development interest has effectively no group to counter its influence when it comes to elected 
representatives and the land management laws they lobby for.
122
   
 While coastal residents and businesses have an interest in rebuilding and further 
developing the New Jersey shore, the largest obstacle to real change regarding costal 
management is the interest of the entire state of New Jersey. The amount of damage caused by 
Hurricane Sandy in terms of dollars is staggering, yet so is the tax revenue that beach tourism 
brings into the state. As of 2011, the tourism industry in New Jersey supported 486,000 jobs and 
contributed $4.4 billion in state and local taxes.
123
 While New Jersey has various tourist 
attractions, the shore is by far the strongest contributor to tourism dollars in the state. Of all the 
tourism dollars generated, more than 72 percent came directly from Atlantic County, Cape May 
County, Ocean County, and Monmouth County.
124
 It is no coincidence that these four counties 
make up the Shore region in New Jersey.
125
 The importance of the New Jersey shore to the 
tourism industry is well known, as the beach attracts vacationers and the New Jersey shore “is 
less than one tank of gas from more than one-quarter of the U.S. population”.126 Suggesting a 
change in the way that coastal construction and land management is implemented would be a 
tough pill to swallow due to the possibility of a reduction in tax revenue. Reducing beach 
                                                            
122 The population of the state could form a coalition to balance the coastal interests since the two parties interests 
are opposing. After a tragedy such as a natural disaster, the damage and destruction is fresh in people’s minds. 
Therefore, coastal residents may overestimate the destruction caused by such a rare event. People away from the 
coast have interests that may not align with those who live at the beach. A person who lives far from the shore in 
New Jersey cares not of the land use regulations in coastal communities, only that the beach is restored so that they 
may enjoy it in the summer months. However, this statewide group is large and non-contiguous. Dispersing 
information regarding the dangers of current land use laws as well as forming a coalition would be both time 
consuming and expensive. In this time, the coastal interests would have already taken action in the public sphere to 
assure that their interests are protected. See generally Poirier, supra note 78, at 265-266, 278. 
123 NEW JERSEY TRAVEL INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, http://www.njtia.org/tourism_numbers.php (last visited Apr. 26, 
2013).  
124 NEW JERSEY COMMERCE, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND TOURISM COMMISSION, 
http://www.state.nj.us/njwindpanel/docs/travtour.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2013). 
125 Id.  
126 Id.  
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construction may be the responsible action in terms of beach sustainability and building 
protection but forgoing tax revenue in a cash-strapped state during a slow economic recovery 
may not be a plan embraced by those in New Jersey who benefit from tourism dollars, namely 
the entire state.  
 It is always difficult to pass legislation that aims to prevent activities that people actively 
enjoy. As early as 1802, people have been visiting the New Jersey shore to take advantage of its 
recreational attributes.
127
 The measures that have been taken to ensure the long term enjoyment 
of the shore have been extensive, from the creation of seawalls to the replenishment of eroding 
beaches.
128
 Changing existing land use laws and eliminating incentives for construction at the 
beach eliminates some of the satisfaction and enjoyment that comes from visiting Point Pleasant, 
Long Beach Island, or any of the other coastal towns in New Jersey. This is not to say that we 
should abolish or even limit peoples use or access to the beach. However, by reducing the 
number of businesses and shore houses, people will inevitably enjoy the beach less. With a 
reduction in the number of restaurants to go to, the amount of time spent at the beach will, in 
turn, decline.  Reducing the construction of boardwalks will also reduce the amusement and 
entertainment that is essential to the shore experience in New Jersey. By reducing home 
construction in coastal flood areas, the convenience of living at the beach will be diminished. 
People desire to live and operate businesses at the beach, despite the risks.
129
 This desire is so 
strong that people will pay a premium on coastal land to take advantage of being near the beach. 
Given this long established yearning to live, visit, and work at the beach, inhibiting peoples 
abilities to do so poses a great barrier to effecting change in coastal development management.  
                                                            
127 PILKEY & DIXON, supra note 3, at 1.   
128 Id. at 38.  
129 See Poirier, supra note 78, at 259-60. 
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B. SUBSIDIZED FLOOD INSURANCE ENCOURAGES COASTAL 
DEVELOPMENT AND DOES NOT COLLECT ENOUGH IN PREMIUMS TO 
REMAIN FINANCIALLY OPERATABLE. 
 
 While private insurance normally reflects actual risk, flood insurance is a subsidy which 
is passed on along to the consumer of flood insurance, namely those who own structures in flood 
plains.
130
 The program is neither actuarially sound in practice or in theory. A moral hazard 
problem is created by people over-investing in coastal properties that are subject to incredible 
damage because they are not shouldering the full burden of the risk associated with living in a 
coastal flood zone.
131
 The federal government and the taxpayers are financially responsible for 
the risks that homeowners in flood zones do not bear. However, this subsidy is required for the 
program to exist at all. Without the subsidy, flood insurance would be prohibitively expensive 
due to the adverse selection problem inherent in national flood insurance.
132
 In 1990, the U.S. 
House of Representatives attempted to remedy this problem slightly by passing a bill which 
would have deprived people who lived in flood prone coastal areas of flood insurance.
133
 
However, for reasons that this paper cannot cover in sufficient amount, the subsidy that is built 
into the National Flood Insurance Program cannot be eliminated. Needless to say, flood 
insurance would be too expensive to purchase if there was no built-in subsidy. 
 The internal structure of the National Flood Insurance Program also prevents substantive 
change in coastal management. As previously stated, the program’s rate increases must follow 
statutorily prescribed limits.
134
 This prevents the NFIP from recovering after years in which a 
                                                            
130 See id. at 261. 
131 Id. at 286. 
132 Only those who truly need and would use flood insurance purchase it. This does not allow the insurance program 
to spread the cost of the program among less risky participants. Id. at 299-300.  
133 KIRKHAM & RUDOLF, supra note 4, at 5. 
134 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 82. 
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large number of claims were made.
135
 With a borrowing capacity of only $2.9 billion, the 
damage that the program will have to pay out due to Hurricane Sandy is likely to cause the NFIP 
to become financially stressed.
136
 While the program collects about $3.5 billion in premiums per 
year, Sandy is on pace to cost over $7 billion
137
 in payouts.
138
 Besides operating in the red, the 
NFIP cannot drop those who file claims for repeated flooding.
139
 These customers often live in 
highly risky areas and cost the program multiples of what their property is worth.
140
  It is 
irresponsible for taxpayers to continue to accept the burden of rebuilding such properties. 
Without substantial changes to the way the NFIP is operated, the program will continue to act as 
a subsidy, drawing people in to risk prone properties.  
V. RECOMMENDATIONS: 
 
With rising sea levels, increased coastal construction, and the prediction of more frequent 
powerful storms, CAFRA is not ideal in its current iteration. In combating the issues present in 
New Jersey’s coastal land use management, the state legislature will have to act rationally. A 
                                                            
135 In 2005, the NFIP had to be bailed out by the United States Treasury Department after it sustained heavy losses 
due to payouts associated with Hurricane Katrina. As of late 2010, the NFIP owed the Treasury upwards of $18 
billion dollars. The government has stated that it does not believe that the program will ever be able to pay back this 
amount, especially if a catastrophic event takes place in the short term. Id.   
136 Id.  
137 As of April 17, 2013, the NFIP has paid out approximately $3.3 billion to the coastal areas of New Jersey as a 
direct result of Hurricane Sandy.  FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, 4086-144, NEW JERSEY RECOVERY FROM 
HURRICANE SANDY: BY THE NUMBERS (April 17, 2013), available at http://www.fema.gov/news-
release/2013/04/17/new-jersey-recovery-hurricane-sandy-numbers.  
138 Even though the NFIP is far from being cash flow positive, the private insurance industry profits from the 
national program. In exchange for selling the national flood insurance, private companies receive an average of $1 
billion per year in premiums even though they take none of the risk associated with insurance. Eric Lipton & 
Felicity Barringer & Mary Williams Walsh, Flood Insurance, Already Fragile, Faces New Stress, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
12, 2012,  at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/13/nyregion/federal-flood-insurance-program-faces-
new-stress.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&. 
139 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 82. 
140  One Biloxi, Miss., property valued at $183,000 flooded 15 times over a decade, 
costing the program $1.47 million, according to federal data provided by the 
agency to a member of Congress. Another in Humble, Tex., has resulted in over 
$2 million in flood payouts even though it was worth just $116,000. 
Eric Lipton et al., supra note 138.  
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balanced approach needs to be implemented that would balance, on one side, a strong tourism 
sector anchored in the coastal regions, tax revenue growth, and keeping the New Jersey shore 
culture alive balanced with the need to protect the states beaches.
141
 While preventing rebuilding 
outright would appear to solve the problem of risky coastal development, this could be 
considered a taking by the state for which property owners would need to be compensated.
142
 As 
previously discussed, when disaster strikes, an elected body will be unable to make rational 
decisions and instead will often fall victim to interest groups.
143
 Therefore, the best course of 
action would be to wait until the effects of a coastal natural disaster, such as Hurricane Sandy, 
are fully understood and appreciated before making changes to CAFRA. While this may sound 
like a request to “kick the ball downfield” and let another group of legislators deal with these 
contentious issues, this plan would weaken coastal interests and allow well thought out plans to 
take shape. A set time table must be put into place so as to allow enough time for damages to be 
assessed and weaknesses brought to light, but not too long to allow the people of New Jersey to 
forget the destruction that can occurs when the sea meets the state.
144
 
Any future plan that even appears to be infringing on shore residents and businesses 
enjoyment of the beach would inevitably lead to push back from coastal interests.
145
 The key to 
convincing these interests, as well as the state as a whole, lies in educating the public about the 
                                                            
141 See Poirier, supra note 78, at 263. 
142 The Supreme Court has held that it is unreasonable for a state to constrain a property owner from using his land 
as originally intended unless the general doctrines under property law prohibit such use. The Court held regulation 
of private land to preserve it is essentially a taking requiring compensation. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-29 (1992). 
143 Poirier, supra note 78, at 260-61. 
144 See generally  id. 278. 
145 When CAFRA was amended in 1994, coastal developers were charged with disseminating disinformation about 
the consequences of the new law. Opponents of the new law claimed that the state would have a “stranglehold over 
single-family property owners”, going so far as to claim that planting gardens in the backyards of coastal homes 
would be regulated. The law was made out to be a power grab by environmentalists and that they would soon force 
people out of their homes and off the barrier islands permanently. JON NORDHEIMER, Smoothing Out the Shore’s 
Building Regulations, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 1994),  http://www.nytimes.com/1994/05/23/nyregion/smoothing-shore-
s-building-regulations-new-jersey-officials-reassure-coastline.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm 
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risks that exist if New Jersey stays the course. The first step towards educating the public is to 
obtain the information and statistics that are necessary to fully grasp the consequences of living 
near the New Jersey shore. This information can be used to show coastal homeowners that flood 
risks are not simply random or an “acts of God” and that planning for such storms is not futile.146 
In order to obtain this information, a study similar to the 1981 New Jersey Master Plan
147
 should 
be conducted by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. While previous 
studies have been conducted by the state regarding population areas adjacent to the coast, a 
modern study is warranted given the recent destruction seen at the Jersey shore. This study 
would focus on the science of coastal geomorphology
148
, the history of natural disasters affecting 
the New Jersey coast, New Jersey’s response to such disasters, and the effects and consequences 
of these responses. This study would also explore the routes that other coastal states have taken 
to protect their beaches and citizens.
 149 
For while all beaches are distinct, similarities exist and 
the collective experiences of all coastal residents could lead to more effective practices within 
New Jersey. Furthermore, while such a study would fully inform those who read it, more 
practical action is needed. After such a study is completed, a reasonable timetable should be set 
for legislative action based on its findings.
150
 This would ensure that such a broad study would 
                                                            
146 See generally Poirier, supra note 78, at 279. 
147 See generally NEW JERSEY DEPT. OF ENVTL. PROT., I NEW JERSEY SHORE PROTECTION MASTER PLAN, 
224.N5N47 (1981). 
148 Geomorphology is defined as “a science that deals with the relief features of the earth or of another celestial body 
(as the moon) and seeks a genetic interpretation of them”. Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/geomorphology (last visited Apr. 26, 2013).  
149 For example, the California Coastal Act requires that any person that develops in a coastal zone must obtain a 
permit from the California Coastal Commission while hearing input from local authorities. Under the Coastal Area 
Management Act, North Carolina has given authority to the Coastal Resources Commission which adopts standards 
for each county to follow in the development and implementation of development and zoning plans. See e.g. Tricia 
A. Sherick, A Comparison of the Coastal Zone Management Policies of the Atlantic and Pacific Coastal Regions 
Versus Programs Implemented in Selected Great Lakes States, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 459, 473-74 (1997). 
150 At the very least, the state legislature should amend CAFRA so its coverage is extended. Given the important role 
of barrier islands and their natural movement, CAFRA needs to cover all barrier islands in New Jersey. Ideally, the 
state would set up a commission that would deal with all land use plans on the barrier islands, hearing suggestions 
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not be discarded and the legislature would be forced to recognize the current problems with the 
regulation of coastal areas. 
A timeline of destructive natural events should be included in every deed of property 
located within coastal flood plains. While a legislative study is important and vital to 
understanding the current risks associated with living in coastal flood plains as well as 
formulating effective policies for such regions, these studies take time and people will rebuild 
and repopulate the New Jersey coast in the interim. A more immediate remedial action that can 
be put into effect quickly is a requirement that would educate the coastal public on past damage 
caused by natural disasters. The Department of Environmental Protection would prepare a simple 
document which would succinctly list natural disasters that have impacted a given area within a 
defined time period.
151
 This list of damaging events must require the property owner to 
acknowledge, by initialing, each event. This would ensure that at the very least, property owners 
would be informed of the dangers of owning a particular piece of property.
152
 Such a list would 
help prevent developers from downplaying the risks associated with living near the beach.
153
 The 
scope of this document requirement would be fairly limited and would only apply to those 
properties located within CAFRA regulated areas. If CAFRA is amended to expand its reach, as 
I propose, the document requirement would reach these new properties. This document 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
from the local municipalities. This would give the state the flexibility it needs to tackle this important problem while 
being slightly more removed from the local politics compared to local municipal governments.  
151 The area that each document would cover would need to be small enough to be relevant to property owners but 
not too small to place an undue burden on the Department of Environmental Protection in preparing and updating 
such documents. Furthermore, the period of events that the document would cover is very important. Too short of a 
time period would not cover enough events to educate people fully on the dangers of coastal living. However, too 
long of a time period would encourage peoples beliefs that storm damage won’t happen to them or their home. See 
generally Poirier, supra note 78, at 278.  
152 Some may argue that this requirement is not economically efficient and could be used as a scare tactic to draw 
people away from purchasing property in coastal areas, thus affecting local economies. However as previously 
discussed, given the strong desire to live by the beach, this document and signature requirement would realistically 
inform the public of the risks associated with their purchase.  But see id. at 279-80.   
153 Id.   
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requirement would provide for immediate protective remedies while the Department of 
Environmental Protection study is under way.  
In order to reduce risky development in coastal flood areas, the subsidy created by the 
NFIP also needs to be reduced. While a complete elimination of subsidized flood insurance is 
unworkable
154
, a reduction in the subsidy is needed to both reduce risky development and keep 
the program financially sustained. In order to accomplish this, the NFIP needs be given the tools 
to balance its risks in a fashion similar to how private insurance operates without subjecting the 
program fully to free market forces.  
One of the problems related to the NFIP that is in dire need of fixing is the programs 
inability to drop policy holders, even if they submit multiple claims in a short period. These 
policy holders are among the most risky and cost the program millions of dollars.
155
 Rebuilding 
these properties that are constantly destroyed represents a drain on the NFIP’s finances. One 
solution to this problem that should be implemented in New Jersey is to only allow a property to 
rebuild a certain amount of times over a defined time period. After that number has been 
reached, the NFIP would give a final payout on the condition that the property be rebuilt outside 
of federally designated flood areas.
156
 This would protect the NFIP’s financials and also 
encourage property owners to move away from dangerous coastal flood lands. 
Finally, the NFIP needs the flexibility that private insurers have in increasing insurance 
premiums. With the statutory limitation on premium increases combined with the limited amount 
of debt the program can take on, it is easy to see how the NFIP can become financially stressed 
                                                            
154 A full reduction in the subsidy created by the NFIP would increase costs to prohibitively high levels for coastal 
land ownership. It was for this reason that private flood insurance could not survive and the government was forced 
to establish the NFIP. See generally Poirier, supra note 78, at 286. 
155 See supra note 130.  
156 For example, a property would be allowed to rebuild 2 times per decade. After the property is destroyed from a 
natural disaster a second time, there would be no payout unless the property owners agree to not rebuild in a flood 
area. If the homeowner chooses to rebuild in a flood area, they would not receive an insurance payout.  
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following a large disaster. This flexibility would increase the cost of flood insurance and make 
premium prices more volatile. Inevitably, this reduces the subsidy that coastal land owners enjoy. 
However, these changes are necessary if the NFIP is to continue to exist. With the stresses 
caused by Hurricane Katrina still impacting the program, things only appear to be getting worse 
for the program.
157
 The NFIP needs flexibility in dealing with its policy holders, especially as the 
federal government continues to deal with budget constraints and as powerful storms become 
more frequent.  
VI. CONCLUSION: 
 
The coast makes up a large portion of New Jersey’s state economy, from housing to 
tourism.
158
 Yet this area took a destructive hit when Hurricane Sandy made land fall, wiping out 
businesses, homes, and large portions of the beach.
159
 This destruction would have been severely 
mitigated if the state had a responsible land use management plan in effect in the coastal flood 
plain areas. The function of barrier islands has been known for quite some time, specifically their 
role in protecting the main land from storm surges created by coastal storms.
160
 However, 
buildings constructed on these barriers islands often suffer severe damage when the islands are 
hit with strong storm surges.
161
  
While New Jersey has had a coastal land management plan in place for some time, 
CAFRA contained gaping loopholes which allowed residential construction to continue with 
                                                            
157 See Eric Lipton et al., supra note 138. 
158 See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.  
159 See supra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.  
160 See supra note 92.  
161 See PILKEY & DIXON, supra note 3, at 27. 
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little state oversight.
162
 Furthermore, the NFIP had provided for subsidized flood insurance 
which further made coastal living more affordable, desirable, and less risky.
163
 In order for New 
Jersey to move forward responsibly with rebuilding efforts, both programs need major overhauls 
in the way they are structured and the areas that they serve. Unfortunately various obstacles stand 
in the way for meaningful change. Further state regulation of coastal flood areas will be blocked 
by local politics, fear of losing tax revenue, and the lack of appreciation of the dangers associated 
with living near the beach.
164
 Small changes, dealing mainly with educating property owners, are 
possible and would educate people about the dangers related with living in coastal flood areas.
165
 
If properly heeded, this education could stem the tide of coastal construction. The NFIP has its 
own structural problems that need to be overcome including their inability to drop policy 
holders, the need for subsidized insurance premiums, and the programs inability to raise 
premiums in the ways private insurance can.
166
 Without these changes, the NFIP will suffer by in 
being in a financially unworkable situation that will perpetuate over time as more coastal storms 
inflict damage on the country.
167
 If New Jersey simply rebuilds, without thoughtful consideration 
on the programs that have thus far driven people to risky areas, a disaster similar to Hurricane 
Sandy will inevitably happen again including the loss of property and life.  
 
 
  
                                                            
162 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.  
163 See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.  
164 See supra part IV. A.  
165 See supra part V.  
166 See supra part IV. B.  
167 See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.  
